









The mystical and the material: Slavoj Žižek and the French reception of mysticism

Abstract: This paper will argue that the work of Slavoj Žižek can be fruitfully understood as a response to mystical theology as it has been received in two strands of 20th century French thought—psychoanalysis and phenomenology—and that Žižek's work in turn offers intriguing possibilities for the re-figuring of mystical theology by feminist philosophy of religion. Twentieth century French psychoanalysis is dominated by the work of Jacques Lacan and by his students Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. All three of these figures engage in significant ways with mystical theology— particularly with the works and figures of female mystics—as a crucial resource for theorising gender and subjectivity. A second strand of the 20th century French recep- tion of mystical theology is the phenomenological tradition, specifically the work of Jacques Derrida. This paper will argue that, drawing on and challenging both of these elements of recent French engagement with mystical theology, Žižek's work offers a materialist ontology which seeks to locate transcendence within immanence and materiality, offering to feminist philosophy of religion the resources for re-thinking the relationship of the mystical to the material. 
Little has been written about Žižek and his relationship to mystical theology, and of course there is always the danger that there is a good reason for this omission. But the wager of this paper is threefold: first, that the contours of Žižek’s thought are very deeply shaped by the 20th century French reception of mysticism; second, that reading Žižek in this light illuminates crucial contours of his work; and third, that, as a result of these first two claims, Žižek’s work in turn offers intriguing possibilities for a feminist philosophy of religion which seeks to engage with the question of mysticism.
Christian mystical theology came into being through the conjunction of still-emergent doctrinal orthodoxy with Neoplatonism.​[1]​ The synthesis which emerged, figuring creation and redemption as a process of emanation and return, has been both enormously fruitful and hugely problematic for the Christian culture to which it gave birth. Amongst other issues, this model has tended to see progress towards God as progress away from the body, and has therefore lent itself to deeply patriarchal forms of religious thought.​[2]​ Feminist philosophy of religion has had to grapple with this legacy. Žižek’s work does not obviously or straightforwardly belong with that of feminist philosophers of religion. Yet the defining feature of his philosophical system is his attempt to draw together Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegelian dialectics, and contemporary quantum physics into an materialist ontology which repeats differently the Neoplatonic attempt to depict the structures of language, desire and the material world as fundamentally connected to one another. As such, Žižek’s work offers to feminist philosophy of religion the possibility of re-thinking the relationship between the mystical and the material. Here I will trace Žižek’s engagement with recent continental philosophical discussions of the relationship of mystical theology, language and desire in order to demonstrate this claim.
Mystical theology is so common as to sometimes appear inescapable in recent continental philosophy.​[3]​ As a result it is in some ways inevitable that Žižek, located firmly within this tradition, should be shaped to some extent by the French engagement with mysticism.​[4]​ However, there are two main ways in which the French reception of mysticism shapes Žižek’s work: firstly, through the theological turn associated with phenomenology and with Derrida in particular; and secondly through the French psychoanalytic tradition, particularly Jacques Lacan, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. I will suggest, roughly, that Derrida represents for Žižek the problem he is attempting to solve, and Lacan the figure to whom he turns to solve this problem, engaging as he does so with questions of gender, sexuality and embodiment which are central to feminist philosophy of religion.

Ontotheology and desire in Derrida and Žižek
Derrida’s first extensive engagement with mystical theology came during his 1968 lecture, ‘Différance’.​[5]​ For Derrida, différance names the impossibility of closure, mastery, or totality; it is the gap between the sign and the thing signified. In this earlier essay Derrida says that, although the denials and refusals of différance may sound like negative theology, they are not. Negative theology is ontotheological, it names a superabundance, a hyperessence, a transcendent anchor for language; while différance ‘is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological – ontotheological – reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology – philosophy – produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return.’​[6]​ Yet Derrida repeatedly returns to this question of negative theology, and comes in time to acknowledge that it is not, after all, so easy to distinguish from his own project. Negative theology and deconstruction have in common, the later Derrida acknowledges, a relationship to the question of how to avoid speaking about that which cannot be spoken about; both are concerned with the establishment and the undoing of boundaries, of identity, of desire.​[7]​
For Derrida, negative theology is riven by the contradictory desire to establish borders and to transgress them; it is both absolutely faithful to theological dogma and also that which absolutely unsettles and undoes all theological propositions; it is torn between negation as the hyper-affirmation of a good beyond being and negation as the acknowledgement of an impossibility, an absence, at the heart of all identity.​[8]​ As such, negative theology is the condition of both the possibility and the impossibility of theological speech, and it therefore shares the structure of other key notions within Derrida’s thought: death, pharmakon, the gift, différance;​[9]​ and also of Derrida’s key ethical notions which require both identity and its disruption, such as hospitality, which requires the host to freely give that which yet remains her own.​[10]​
Although Žižek is often dismissive of ‘the usual gang of democracy-to-come-deconstructionist-postsecular-Levinasian-respect-for-Otherness suspects’, he repeatedly acknowledges the proximity of Derrida’s work to his own.​[11]​ Though he critiques Derrida on numerous occasions, most of these critiques are attempts to demonstrate how Derrida misreads Hegel or Lacan in such a way as to miss the parallels between their thought and his own.​[12]​ Žižek’s recent work, Less Than Nothing, contains several passages in which he explicitly appropriates Derridean language to articulate his own ideas, speaking about his ontology and politics in terms of l’avenir,​[13]​ différance,​[14]​ and pharmakon.​[15]​ 
And yet, for all this proximity, there remains a crucial difference between the two thinkers.  This difference takes the form of what Žižek calls the ‘parallax gap’, where what changes is not the basic configuration of thought but the perspective from which that basic configuration is seen, a subtle shift in register which is sometimes so small as to seem almost imperceptible but which, nonetheless, changes everything.​[16]​ For example, Žižek says that Derrida unearths the impossibility of identity and yet cannot make the Hegelian move of recognising that impossibility is, precisely, constitutive of identity; Derrida speaks about a central signifier which imposes stability on meaning and also about an excessive element within the system which functions simultaneously as lack and as surplus; but he cannot recognise that the supplement and the Master Signifier are one and the same.​[17]​ 
Žižek fully endorses Derrida’s notion that any identity is always already ruptured, impossible, but for Žižek, he and Derrida are distinguished according to the different ways in which they relate to this impossibility. He describes this difference in terms of the Lacanian distinction between desire and drive, which are the two ways of relating to the lost object, the impossibility at the heart of identity. For Žižek, crucially, Derrida relates to impossibility according to the logic of desire, which both knows that identity is impossible and yet will not give up hope in the possibility of wholeness; whereas Žižek seeks to relate to impossibility according to the Lacanian logic of drive which, realising that no object can ever satisfy it, instead begins to derive its satisfaction precisely from repeatedly missing the object of desire.​[18]​ So desire aims for wholeness and repeatedly fails; drive does the same thing but failure is precisely its aim. 
This difference between Derrida and Žižek is also a specifically gendered difference. The configuration of desire, language and being which is present in negative theology from its inception has always been gendered.​[19]​ Yet while Derrida’s work seeks to unsettle both the ground of being and the gendering of philosophy, he also insists on an ‘irreducible gap’ between ‘ontological difference and gender difference’.​[20]​ By contrast, Žižek’s reliance on the Lacanian account of subjectivity, sexuality and mysticism means that the question of gender becomes central to the question of human identity and transformation.

Lacan, sexuation, and feminist philosophy
While Derrida’s discussions of mysticism tend to focus on the negative theology of Dionysius the Areopagite, whose ‘mysticism of the intellect’ is primarily philosophical and abstract rather than affective,​[21]​ Lacan appeals instead to much later forms of mysticism in which individual experience is foregrounded. Yet the central themes of Dionysius’ work remain present, particularly in Lacan’s Seminar XX, which deals not only with gender, sexuality and mysticism, but also with ontology, God, and Neoplatonism.​[22]​
For Lacan, the subject is brought into being by the creation of a boundary, a cut which is both an internal fissure and a division between the self and others. This cut is to do with the way that the subject is, from the very beginning, caught up in the economy of the desire and the language of others, and also to do with the gap between the human child’s ability to conceive of herself as a particular individual and her ability to control the boundaries of her own identity. The cut is also the cut of what Lacan calls ‘castration’ and at the core of Lacan’s account of sexuation is his thesis that the masculine and feminine subjective positions are two ways of relating to this essential incompleteness of the subject.
Central to Lacan’s understanding of sexuation is his claim that ‘there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship’. This is the dual claim that, on the one hand, the sexual relationship does not do what it ostensibly sets out to do and, on the other hand, that this failure is precisely its real aim.​[23]​ The sexual relationship is, in Lacanian terminology, fundamentally about the relationship to the phallus, which represents for the subject that which was lost as they came into being. It stands for sexuality insofar as it relies on the fantasy of wholeness, of the subject’s completion, the Aristophanic fantasy that there is some person out there who will complete me. For Lacan, the sexual relationship is doomed to fail because it is never really about two people becoming one but about the clash of two individuals’ narcissistic attempts to reduce the other person to that which will make them a harmonious whole. This impossibility of the sexual relationship, of being completed by another person is, for Lacan, precisely the point: since it is only my incompleteness which brings me into being in the first place, completion represents not happiness or dissatisfaction but the dissolution of the subject; psychosis or death.​[24]​
For Lacan there are two ways of relating to this inevitable failure of the sexual relationship, ‘the male way’ or ‘the female way’ (although Lacan does sometimes attempt to distinguish between men and masculinity and women and femininity, he does not do so consistently).​[25]​ The male way is the logic of desire, which relies on the fantasy of the possibility of attaining wholeness by re-integrating the lost object, yet which must constantly and unconsciously sabotage itself in order to prevent the dissolution of the subject: this is the logic, says Lacan, of courtly love, of the deliberate choice of an unattainable beloved. But to explicate the logic of femininity, Lacan turns to mysticism, citing in particular the writings of Hadewijch, of St John of the Cross, and Bernini’s statue of Theresa of Avila. There are some obvious problems here, as Lacan seeks to explicate feminine subjectivity via a woman, one man and a man’s depiction of a woman in ecstasy (he goes on, modestly, to include his own Écrits in the canon of mystical writing).​[26]​ 
The contrast between masculinity and femininity, says Lacan, is the contrast between eros and love. Where masculine eros seeks to make two into one, to gather the multiplicity of the world into a single unity, a Neoplatonic One, feminine love relates to the other as a singular individual.​[27]​ Instead of eros, the gathering of everything into union, Lacan says that analysis seeks to assert the existence of the One as a singular individual, and to explore not desire, but love. In some ways this is an attempt to reinstate Anders Nygren’s distinction between eros and agape; but unlike Nygren, Lacan ranges mysticism on the side of agape rather than eros, despite its associations with Neoplatonism and erotic union with God.​[28]​
This account of ‘feminine’, mystical jouissance is deeply ambiguous. On the one hand, because for Lacan there is no subject prior to castration, he rejects any attempt to reify the figure of the woman as the maternal ground of being, the promise of wholeness, or a lost edenic state, just as Derrida rejects the notion of the God of ontotheology as the ground of language.​[29]​ But it is precisely Lacan’s troubling gender politics which problematise this attempt to assign women to the side of love. While he valorises women’s mystical experience he associates this mystical experience with a ‘jouissance of the body’ which women can experience but cannot speak about, which is somehow present in women’s mystical texts and yet can only be articulated by a man: by Jacques Lacan.​[30]​ This ambiguity over the relationship of women to language, the body, and mystical experience leaves a complicated legacy with which Lacan’s successors wrestle.
Particularly important in the reception of these elements of Lacan’s work are Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, who pick up Lacan’s problematic of sexual difference and grapple with it in different ways. Whilst the two have significant differences with one another as well as with Lacan, they have one crucial commonality. Where, for Lacan, the cut that brings the subject into being is both internal to the subject and also a cut between the subject and the other, both Irigaray and Kristeva focus on the distinction between the subject and the other rather than on the distinction internal to the subject. Irigaray’s work prioritises distinction, focusing her attention on the question of how to establish men and women as sufficiently separate beings that they are able to relate to one another as other.​[31]​ She values mysticism because it gives women a distinctive voice: the mystical writings are, she says, ‘the only place in the history of the West in which woman speaks and acts so publicly.’​[32]​ By contrast, Kristeva’s work seeks to trouble distinction, exploring, through her key notions of the semiotic and the abject, the blurring of the boundaries between the self and the other. The semiotic in particular is associated with mysticism, which Kristeva values insofar as it unsettles settled identities.​[33]​

Žižek: the mystical as material
By contrast, Žižek’s response to the Lacanian account of sexuation is to propose an ontology of the subject in which the crucial distinction is not between subjects but is internal to the subject. In doing so, he draws together Lacanian psychoanalysis with Hegelian dialectics and contemporary science. This idiosyncratic synthesis enables him, effectively, to repeat the original move of mystical theology, the connection that thinkers like Dionysius the Areopagite make between the subject’s desire, the structure of language and subsequently the structure of being itself. 
While, for Lacan, the cut which brings the subject into being is both an internal fissure and a division between the subject and the Other, Žižek’s Hegelian reading of Lacan is absolutely clear that the rupture internal to the subject has priority over the rupture between the subject and others. ‘“Man” and “woman” together do not form a Whole,’ he argues ‘since each of them is already in itself a failed Whole.’​[34]​ Žižek argues that, for Lacan, it is the grafting of the subject’s inherent incompleteness onto the act of sex, the attempt to find an impossible completeness via sexuality, which results in the necessary failure, the impossibility of the sexual relationship. ‘What we experience as sexuality’, Žižek says, ‘is precisely the effect of the contingent act of “grafting” the fundamental deadlock of symbolization on to the biological opposition of male and female’.​[35]​ The biological act of intercourse is treated as a means to resolve a symbolic deadlock, and so it inevitably fails. 
This means that, for Žižek, the difference between men and women is not a difference of essence or even of relation to one another per se, but a difference between ways of relating to the universal structure of human subjectivity. Men and women are related as desire is related to drive, and so are separated only by a parallax shift, this shift between two perspectives on the same basic structure. For this reason, Žižek strenuously resists any appeal to a ‘feminine essence’ or any suggestion that it is possible to understand women outside of the phallic symbolic order.​[36]​ For him, the feminine subjective position fully acknowledges the gap which exists at the heart of all subjectivity, whereas the masculine subjective position seeks to deny and externalise this gap. Because, for Žižek, the subject is brought into being by the symbolic order (which cannot be disentangled from the body or materiality more generally), it is not possible to appeal, as Kristeva does, to a pre-linguistic semiotic, or to suggest, as Irigaray does, that it is possible to create a feminine form of subjectivity which escapes the positioning of women by masculine discourse.​[37]​ Women belong to the symbolic order; they are, if anything, more fully incorporated into it than men. To suggest that there is some element of feminine subjectivity which escapes the symbolic order is, precisely, to repeat a masculine fantasy.​[38]​ To posit a ‘feminine essence’ is to locate feminine resistance outside of the symbolic order, to continue to posit women as the inert, resistant material upon which the symbolic order builds; to see femininity as intrinsic to the symbolic order is, for Žižek, to open up the possibility of transforming the symbolic order by exposing its inherent excess, its internal contradictions.​[39]​ 
For Žižek, then, Kristeva and Irigaray are almost right to appeal to the outside of language or the other of subjectivity; except that this otherness, this semiotic, this body, is not really outside of the subject but is internal to the subject. That which transcends the subject is the subject itself; transcendence is not the external intervention of another being but the crack within immanence, which constitutes immanence.​[40]​ For Žižek, the mystical experience proper is not the confrontation with a transcendent other but the confrontation with the subject’s own inherent limitation.
But Žižek’s reworking of mysticism and gender does not stop here. Žižek’s earlier work brings together this structure of ‘the one of the split’ with both Hegelian dialectics and Marxist ideology critique in order to suggest that society too is internally ruptured, generating its own excess. Just as gender is the attempt of individual subjects to externalise their constitutive antagonism, so too with class struggle: the one of society is ‘“held together” by the very antagonism, split, that forever prevents its closure in a harmonious, transparent, rational Whole.’​[41]​ After a crucial engagement with both Schelling and quantum physics, Žižek further extends this basic model of identity to material reality itself.​[42]​ The material world is constituted by ‘a pre-transcendental gap/rupture, the Freudian name for which is the drive’.​[43]​ This is, effectively, a repetition of the move which constituted the birth of mystical theology, when thinkers including Dionysius and Augustine drew on Plato and Plotinus to articulate an account of theological speech which was essentially bound up both with the individual’s desire and with the structure of the created world as a whole. Neoplatonism positions the goal of human life as the return to the One from which it came, an absorption into an originary state of harmony which cannot, ultimately, be separated from death, the undoing of the process by which individual beings and bodies came into existence. By contrast, Žižek’s account of material, individual and social identity as all alike structured as internally inconsistent, ruptured wholes positions this very inconsistency, the impossibility of completion, as generative.
This broadening of the structure of the Lacanian subject to encompass the whole of material reality allows Žižek to take the basic gesture of transposing the opposition between the subject and the other into a rupture within the subject and to repeat it at a number of different levels: so, for example, the gendered opposition between the body and language becomes a rupture within language, as does the opposition between mystical experience or apophasis and language; the opposition between immanence and transcendence becomes a rupture within immanence;  and the opposition between nature and grace becomes a rupture within nature. 
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